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A WAY OUT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
JURISDICTION TANGLE*
John M. Rogers**
When Congress recently eliminated the $10,000 amount-in-contro-
versy requirement for federal question jurisdiction in suits against the
United States, its agencies, and its officers, Congress effectively re-
solved, for most cases, the problem of finding subject matter jurisdic-
tion for federal judicial review of federal administrative agency action.'
Whatever the resolution of such distinct issues as whether there is a
cause of action, whether sovereign immunity is waived, and whether
administrative remedies have been exhausted,2 subject matter jurisdic-
* Copyright @ John M. Rogers 1979.
** Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1970, Stanford Univer-
sity; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. Formerly attorney, Appellate Section, Civil Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. While at the Department of Justice the author
assisted in the representation of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the following
cases referred to in this article: Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Alabama Hospital Associ-
ation v. Califano, 587 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979); Association of American Medical Colleges v.
Califano, 569 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1977); DeLao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1977); Dr.
John T. MacDonald Foundation v. Mathews, 554 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1977), modj'ed, 571 F.2d 328
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 250 (1978); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1976);
White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The author
does not purport to represent the views of the Department of Justice or the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
I. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 94-574]). Section 1331(a) as amended reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no
such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States,
any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
Prior to Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the courts were divided on the question
whether the Administrative Procedure Act [APA], 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), was an independ-
ent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction when § 1331 was unavailable because of the
amount in controversy requirement and when no other jurisdictional statute was applicable. See
cases cited in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 104 n.4. The Supreme Court in Sanders, relying in
part on Congress' action in eliminating the amount in controversy requirement of § 1331, held
that the APA contained no grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 104-07.
2. In addition to specific statutes providing for judicial review of particular kinds of agency
action, the APA generally provides for a cause of action in the nature ofjudicial review to persons
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tion, at least, will be provided, if nowhere else,3 by the amended federal
question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The applicability of
section 1331, however, is specifically precluded in an important class of
cases: those arising out of the Social Security Act.4 In such cases the
Act itself often, though not always, provides jurisdiction for judicial
review. When the Act does not clearly provide such jurisdiction, diffi-
cult issues arise. May Congress constitutionally deny judicial review of
assertedly illegal or unconstitutional agency actions by means of statu-
torily precluding any cause of action for such review? If it cannot, can
it achieve the same effect by limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts? The issues are fundamental and perplexing, and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that it will go out of its way to
avoid them.5 No attempt will be made here to go where giants fear to
tread. Instead, the jurisdictional statutes will be examined in an at-
tempt, consistent with existing precedent, to interpret the statutes to
maximize the furtherance of both the congressional policy of strictly
"suffering legal wrong," 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), because of "final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in a court." Id. § 704. The cause of action is limited, however, where
"statutes preclude judicial review," id. § 701(a)(l) or "agency action is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law." Id. § 701(a)(2). See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1977).
In addition to amending § 1331 to expand federal jurisdiction, Pub. L. No. 94-574 also elimi-
nated the defense of sovereign immunity in APA suits "seeking relief other than money damages."
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). In many suits involving the Social Security Act, the issue of sovereign
immunity remains because retroactive payment of benefits, or another equivalent of money dam-
ages, is sought. A statute specifically providing entitlement to benefits, in conjunction with a stat-
utory grant of jurisdiction to obtain the benefits if denied, may provide a waiver of sovereign
immunity, but the jurisdictional grant alone is insufficient. See Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161,
165-66 (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Mathews, 539 F.2d 1111, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 1976).
Pub. L. No. 94-574 makes clear that defenses such as failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies remain available to agencies:
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the
court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable
ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to
suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The legislative history states that the grounds referred to in § 702(1) in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following:
(I) [E]xtraordinary relief should not be granted because of the hardship to the defendant
or to the public ("balancing the equities") or because the plaintiff has an adequate rem-
edy at law; (2) action committed to agency discretion; (3) express or implied preclusion
of judicial review; (4) standing; (5) ripeness; (6) failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies; and (7) an exclusive alternative remedy.
S. REP. No. 996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6132.
3. See Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 607 n.6 (1978); Ralpho v. Bell,
569 F.2d 607, 615 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 267 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1182 n.40 (3d Cir. 1977) (and cases cited therein),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 98 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Koden v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1977); Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d
1113, 1115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977); Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1186, 1188
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976).
5. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-
67 (1974). See generally Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); Hart, The Power of Congress
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953);
see also South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1976).
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limiting judicial review outside of the Social Security Act and the con-
stitutionally-based policy of permitting federal courts to resolve consti-
tutional issues in the final instance.
JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW FOUND IN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
For cases arising under the Federal Old-Age Survivors, and Disa-
bility Insurance Benefits program [OASDI],6 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) pro-
vides:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be
binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No
findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any
person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided.
No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or
employee thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 [now
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1363] to recover on any claim arising under this
sub-chapter [OASDI].7
The Medicare Act' explicitly incorporated this provision by reference.9
In addition, the provisions for the Supplemental Security Income Pro-
gram 10 appear to have incorporated this provision by reference." Sec-
tion 405(h)12 by its terms does not preclude review where the Act itself
provides for such review. In order, therefore, to determine what is pre-
cluded, a preliminary review of the parts of the Social Security Act that
provide for judicial review under these three programs-and the limits
found in these parts-is necessary.
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
OASDI provides old age and survivors benefits to covered workers
and their survivors, when various eligibility requirements are met and
the worker has sufficient quarters of Social Security coverage. 13 Simi-
larly, sufficiently insured workers under the age of sixty-five are enti-
tled to disability insurance benefits if they have filed a claim and suffer
from a disability as statutorily defined.' 4 The Secretary is required by
the Act to make findings of fact and decisions "as to the rights of any
individual applying for a payment"' 5 under OASDI, and, if the claim-
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976).
7. Id. § 405(h).
8. Id. §§ 1395-1395pp.
9. Id. § 1395ii.
10. Id. §§ 1381-1383c.
11. Id. § 1383(c)(1).
12. Id. § 405(h).
13. Id. §§ 402(a), (b), 414(a), (b).
14. Id. § 423(a).
15. Id. § 405(b).
1979)
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ant so requests within six months, to provide "reasonable notice and
opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision."' 6 In addition,
the Secretary is required to provide a hearing on timely request to an
employee or a survivor who is dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision
to change, or refusal of a request to change, the employee's earnings
records. 17  The regulations accordingly provide an opportunity for
hearings if an initial claim for benefits is denied or is otherwise ad-
versely decided, 8 if benefits already granted are terminated, ' 9 if certain
other decisions affecting the amount of benefits are made,20 or if a
proper request is made to revise earnings records. 2' The claimant or
relevant party is entitled to reconsideration of the "initial determina-
tion"22 upon request filed within sixty days of the date of mailing23
notice of the "initial determination."'2 If the party is still dissatisfied
with the decision after reconsideration, he can obtain an evidentiary
hearing before an administrative law judge upon request filed within
sixty days of the date of mailing notice of the reconsidered determina-
tion. Within sixty days of notice of the administrative law judge's
decision, review of that decision may be sought from the Appeals
Council, which, in its discretion, may review the administrative law
judge's decision.26
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides that "[a]ny individual, after any final
decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party,
.. . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action. . . brought
in the district court of the United States."' 7 Findings of fact are sub-
16. Id.
17. Id. § 405(c)(7).
18. 20 C.F.R. § 404.905(a) (1979).
19. Id. § 404.905(d).
20. Id. § 404.905(b).
21. Id. § 404.905(g).
22. Id. § 404.909, .910.
23. Id. § 404.911. Prior to November 1, 1976, the request had to be filed within six months of
the date of mailing of notice of the initial determination. See 41 Fed. Reg. 47,915-16 (1976).
24. 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1979).
25. Id. §§ 404.916, .918. See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976).
26. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945-.947 (1979). At each stage of the administrative proceedings-ini-
tial determination, reconsideration, administrative law judge's decision, and Appeals Council de-
cision-a decision rendered on a claim becomes the final decision of the Secretary unless further
review is timely sought by the party. Id. §§ 404.908, .916, .940, .951. The reulations provide that
such a final determination or decision provides a basis for administrative res judicala. Id.
§ 404.937(a). The final determination or decision, however, may be reopened up to 12 months
after notice of the initial determination, id. § 404.957(a), or thereafter, "upon a finding of good
cause for reopening" until four years after the date of the notice of the initial determination. Id.
§ 404.957(b). Moreover, a final decision may be reopened "at any time" when the determination
or decision "is unfavorable, in whole or in part, to the party thereto but only for the purpose of
correcting clerical error or error on the face of the evidence on which such determination or deci-
sion was based," id. § 404.957(c)(8), and in certain other limited circumstances. See Id.
§ 404.957(c)(l)-(7), (9).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of
[Vol. 21
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jected to substantial evidence review.28
There is one other provision for judicial review under OASDI.
Because of difficulties perceived by Congress in the constitutionality of
taxing state and local government employees, such employees are cov-
ered by Social Security Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
only through voluntary agreements between the Secretary and the rele-
vant state (or instrumentality of more than one state).29 Under such
agreements the state collects employee contributions, and pays to the
Secretary an amount equal to what the employees would have paid in
Social Security taxes had they been directly covered.3" A decision by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW], regarding
the amount that a state owes under the agreement, following adminis-
trative review (without a statutory requirement for a hearing), is judi-
cially reviewable,3 but only at the instance of the state (or, where
applicable, an instrumentality of two or more states).32
Supplemental Security Income
The second major program to which section 405(h) applies is the
Supplemental Security Income program [SSI]. 33 In October 1972, Con-
gress repealed the categorical assistance program of federal grants to
state-administered welfare assistance programs for the aged, blind, and
disabled, and established SSI,34 which, in effect, federalized state wel-
fare programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. The Act requires that
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing be provided for
"any individual who is or claims to be an eligible individual or eligible
spouse and is in disagreement with any determination" under SSI, if a
request is made within sixty days after notice of the determination.35
The Act also incorporates the judicial review provisions and limitations
such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. . . . As
part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record
including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based.
The [district] court shall have power to enter. . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehear-
ing, The findings of the Secretary as to any fact,' if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive. . . . The judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be
subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.
28. Id.
29. Id. §§ 410(a)(7), 418(a)(1). See generally Secretary of HEW v. Snell, 416 F.2d 840, 841-
42 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 418(e)(l)(A) (1976).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 418(s), (t)(1).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976).
34. Supplemental Security Income Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1381-1383c (1976)).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(1) (1976).
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found in section 405.36
Medicare
The third major program to which section 405(h) applies is Medi-
care. Unlike under OASDI and SSI, the judicial review provisions
under the Medicare Act37 are specifically limited to certain kinds of
administrative decisions.38 While the preclusion of review and the lim-
itation of jurisdiction of section 405(h) are incorporated generally into
the Act,39 the provision for judicial review is incorporated only for cer-
tain purposes.40 To understand these limitations a brief overview of
how the Medicare Act works is required.4'
Enacted in 1965, as title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Federal
Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, popularly known as
Medicare, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp. It consists of two
substantively distinct parts, one providing insurance for hospital and
related post-hospital services, known as Part A,42 the other providing
insurance for supplementary medical services, primarily physicians'
services, known as Part B.43
Part A. Under Part A, the hospital insurance program, persons
aged sixty-five and older, and certain younger disabled persons, 44 re-
ceive essential hospital services, 45 paid for from a trust fund financed
by wage taxes on employees and self-employers. 46 The hospital serv-
ices are paid for directly by the government. Only a hospital or other
institution that qualifies as a "provider of services" under section
1395x(u), 47 however, is eligible to receive payments under the pro-
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The Secretary shall provide reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing to any
individual who is or claims to be an eligible individual or eligible spouse and is in disa-
greement with any determination under. . . [SSI] with respect to eligibility of such indi-
vidual for benefits, or the amount of such individual's benefits, if such individual
requests a hearing on the matter in disagreement within sixty days after notice of such
determination is received ...
(3) The final determination of the Secretary after a hearing under paragraph (1) shall be
subject to judicial review as provided in . . . [42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976)] to the same
extent as the Secretary's final determinations under. . . [Id. § 405].
37. Id. §§ 1395-1395pp.
38. See id. §§ 1395ff, 1395ii, 1395pp(d).
39. Id. § 1395ii.
40. Id. §§ 1395f(b), 1395pp(d).
41. The following summary is borrowed in part from the opinions of the Fifth Circuit in
Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976); Szekely v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 517 F.2d 345, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 960 (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-2 (1976).
43. Id. §§ 1395j-1395w.
44. Id. § 1395c.
45. Id. §§ 1395d(a),(c),(d).
46. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401(b), 3101(b), 3111(b) (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (1976).
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gram.48 It can do so only after entering into an agreement with the
Secretary of HEW that meets the requirements of section 1395cc(a).49
Among other things, the participating institution must agree not to
charge a Medicare beneficiary for any services received under the pro-
gram,5 0 but instead to look only to the government for compensation.,'
Payment for services is based on the reasonable cost of such services.5 2
Day-by-day administration of the Medicare program is handled
by "fiscal intermediaries." These are private, nongovernment entities,
frequently health and accident insurance companies (including Blue
Cross organizations), nominated by a provider or group of providers.
They enter into contracts with HEW and serve as HEW's agent for
many functions, such as hospital audits, information dissemination,
and fund disbursement.5 3 Certain determinations under the Medicare
Act scheme are made, at least in the first instance, by the fiscal interme-
diary on behalf of the Secretary of HEW.
Reimbursing a provider for services rendered to a Medicare bene-
ficiary requires resolution, in particular cases, of two important and
distinct issues: (1) Whether the services provided are covered by sec-
tion 1395d and not excluded by section 1395y, and (2) whether the
amount paid for the services is the "reasonable cost" under section
1395x(v).
The issues in coverage determinations are defined by sections
1395d and 1395y. Section 1395d defines the benefits covered by Medi-
care: In-patient hospital services, post-hospital extended care services,
and post-hospital home health services, with annual day or visit limits
for each. 4 Section 139 5y defines exclusions from the general definition
of scope of benefits in section 1395d. The most important, as a practi-
cal matter, are the exclusions from coverage of services "which are not
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury"5 5 or which are for "custodial care."5 6
On the other hand, the issues in cost determinations are defined by
section 1395x(v) and the applicable regulations.57 In determining the
48. Id. § 1395f(a).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1395cc(a)(1)(A) (other than for co-insurance and deductibles provided for in id.
§ 1395cc(a)(2)(A)).
51. Id. § 1395f.
52. Id. § 1395f(b). The amount is determined pursuant to 1395x(v) and the appropriate regu-
lations. For periods after 1972, providers may be paid the customary charges with respect to
provided services, if less than the reasonable cost. See Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 233(f), 86 Stat. 1412
(1972); 42 C.F.R. 405.455 (1979).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1976).
54. Id. § 1395d(a)(l)-(3).
55. Id. § 1395y(a)(1).
56. Id. § 1395y(a)(9).
57. See 42 C.F.R. § 405A01-.488 (1979).
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reasonable cost of services, HEW not only makes allocations based on
the proportion of charges made with respect to Medicare beneficiaries
to all charges for hospitals services,5" but also makes determinations as
to the reasonableness of costs according to the various types of services
provided to Medicare beneficiaries and the various classes of institu-
tions or agencies that are providers.5 9
Oral evidentiary hearings with regard to decisions of the Secretary
in Medicare cases, and judicial review thereof, are provided by the Act
only in limited circumstances. Subject to amount in controversy re-
quirements, Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to an oral evidentiary
hearing and judicial review (like that for OASDI applicants) on issues
relating to their eligibility for Medicare,6" and whether a particular
service is covered. 61 These coverage issues include determining the
medical necessity of services62 but do not include the determination of
reasonable cost, since the beneficiary receiving services has no interest
in the amount a provider receives for furnishing services to the benefi-
ciary.
For periods prior to October 30, 1972, provider hospitals were stat-
utorily entitled to a similar hearing and judicial review only on issues
related to whether they are qualified as providers.63 The Medicare Act
was amended in 197264 and 197465 to permit providers, subject to
amount in controversy requirements and only for post-1972 periods, to
obtain a hearing before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
[PRRB] and subsequent judicial review, if they are dissatisfied with the
amount of reimbursement due for covered services (i.e., cost determi-
nations).66 The PRRB and any court reviewing a decision of the PRRB
are, however, expressly precluded from reviewing issues regarding ex-
clusions from coverage.67
For periods after October 30, 1972, the hearing and review rights
of providers are extended to certain coverage disputes also. The statu-
tory scheme was modified to accommodate beneficiaries who accepted
services while believing they were covered, only to find out that the
services were not covered by Medicare and that they then owed the
58. Id. § 405.452(a).
59. 42 .U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976).
60. Id. §§ 1395ff(b)(1)(A), (B).
61. Id. § 1395ff(b)(1)(C).
62. Id.
63. See Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 330 (1965) (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(1976)).
64. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 243(a), 86 Stat. 1420.
65. Id., Pub. L. No. 93-484, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1459.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395o0(a) (1976).
67. Id. § 1395oo(g).
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hospital for the uncovered services.68 Payment is permitted for certain
uncovered services where the beneficiary could not reasonably have
been expected to know that the service would not be covered.69 In par-
ticular, where services would otherwise be precluded as medically un-
necessary under section 1395y(a)(1) or as custodial under section
1395y(a)(9), and the beneficiary did not know and could not reasonably
have been expected to know that the services were not covered, then
payment will be made, unless the provider knew or could be expected
to know that the services were not covered.7" In the latter case, the
amendment provides that the beneficiary will not have to pay for the
services and will be indemnified for any payments to the provider.7'
Because the provider cannot charge the beneficiary for provided serv-
ices even though the services were not covered by Medicare, and an
innocent beneficiary has no need to seek a hearing, the amendment
provides that, after a beneficiary has waived his rights to a hearing and
review, the provider is generally entitled to those hearing and review
rights.72
Part B. Part B of Medicare provides voluntary supplementary
medical insurance. Under Part B, persons aged sixty-five and older
and certain disabled persons,73 are eligible to enroll to obtain benefits'
in return for payment of monthly premiums. These premiums and
contributions from the federal government go into a separate trust fund
which pays for benefits, including "medical and other health serv-
ices.'75
An enrolled individual who obtains a covered service can either
pay for the service and request direct reimbursement 76 or assign this
right of reimbursement to the person providing the service.77 All pay-
ments are subject to a deductible amount.78 The limitations on cover-
age that apply under Part A,79 also apply under Part B.8°
For the administration of Part B, HEW is authorized to act
through "carriers," 81 which are analogous to the fiscal intermediaries
68. Id. § 1395pp(a).
69. Id.§ 1395pp(a)(2).
70. Id. § 1395pp(b).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1395pp(d).
73. Id. § 1395o.
74. Id. § 1395p.
75. Id. § 1395k(a)(l) (such as physician and diagnostic services, outpatient physical therapy,
ambulance, and home health services).
76. Id. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(i) (80% of the reasonable charge in most cases. Id. § 13951(a)).
77. Id. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii).
78. Id. § 13951(b).
79. See text & note 55 supra.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1976).
81. Id. § 1395u(a).
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under Part A.82 Payment for most services is limited to the "reasonable
charges" for the services provided. 3 Beneficiaries are reimbursed, or
doctors holding assignments are paid, on the basis of the amounts
charged, subject to the carriers' responsibility to establish appropriate
reasonable amounts.8 4
Hearings and review rights under Part B are more limited than
under Part A. When payment on a claim is denied or the amount is in
controversy, the patient has a statutory right to "an opportunity for a
fair hearing by the carrier," 5 but is provided no statutory right to judi-
cial review.86 Under HEW regulations, a physician who has accepted
an assignment from a patient has the same right to a hearing as the
patient.87 The regulations also provide that a carrier will make an ini-
tial determination on a claim for benefits, 88 provide a separate review
determination,89 and an oral evidentiary hearing. 90 The hearing of-
ficer's decision is final, subject only to reopening provisions9 like those
under OASDI.92
The Act provides for judicial review under Part B only to deter-
mine whether a person is eligible to enroll or has enrolled.93 As to
these enrollment issues, the regulations provide the same procedures
for hearing and review as are available under OASDI. 94
THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF SECTION 405
Section 405(h), as we have seen, limits judicial review of findings
and decisions and precludes jurisdiction over claims arising under So-
cial Security, except as provided in the Act. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Weinberger v. Sa!fi,95 however, the federal courts
frequently had little difficulty in hearing cases that fell outside the juris-
dictional grants in the Act itself. The prohibitory language of section
405(h) was generally either interpreted away,96 or dealt with summarily
82. See text & note 53 supra.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395/(a)(1) (1976).
84. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.501-.544 (1978).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1976). The right is subject to an amount in controversy re-
quirement for periods after October 30, 1972. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
603, § 262(b), 86 Stat. 1448 (1972).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (1976).
87. 42 C.F.R. § 405.801(a) (1978). For periods after October 30, 1972, the right is statutory in
most circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(d) (1976).
88. 42 C.F.R. § 405.803 (1978).
89. Id. § 405.8 10. If requested within six months.
90. Id. § 405.820. If requested within six months of the review determination.
91. Id. §405.835.
92. See note 26 supra.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(B) (1976).
94. 42 C.F.R. § 905 (1)(2) (1978).
95. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
96. See Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 666-68 (2d Cir.
1973) ("Where the Medicare Act establishes procedures for review of the Secretary's decision, a
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or not at all. 97 In Salfl and two subsequent cases, Mathews v. El-
dridge98 and Califano v. Sanders,99 the Supreme Court narrowly lim-
ited jurisdiction in cases arising under the Social Security Act where
section 405(h) applies. As to the jurisdiction issue, the decision in each
case was unexceptionable, but part of the rationale of the three cases
leads to unreasonable results in other kinds of Social Security Act
cases. Examination of some of these results will suggest a better way to
reconcile the three cases, and others, in a manner consistent with con-
gressional policies that the Supreme Court might have sought to fur-
ther.
In Safi, the Supreme Court held that the language of section
405(h) barred federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over
a constitutional challenge to a requirement that, to be eligible for survi-
vor benefits under OASDI, widows and stepchildren be related to a
wage earner for at least nine months prior to his death.' The wife of a
wage earner who died less than nine months after the marriage brought
suit to challenge the duration requirement. 10 She had previously filed
a claim and sought reconsideration, but had not requested a hearing.10 2
The complaint asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal
question), 1361 (federal mandamus), and 5 U.S.C. § 702 (section 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act).10 3  A three-judge district court
found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, declared the duration-of-
relation provision of the statute unconstitutional, and ordered retroac-
tive benefits to be provided to a class of all persons disqualified by the
invalidated provision. 'I In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the duration-of-relation provision was constitu-
tional. 105
Although the issue of jurisdiction was not briefed, the Court also
discussed at length the effect of section 405(h). 106 The Court first re-
court may not review that decision by other means. However, where the Act does not provide
such procedures, section 405(h) does not preclude review."); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1,
3-5 (2d Cir. 1966) ("§ 405(h). . .simply forbids attempts to review final decisions on the merits
by any route other than § 405(g)" but permits review of other decisions, not reviewable under
§ 405(g)).
97. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 641 n.8 (1975); Griffin v. Richardson,
346 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Md.), af'dmem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.
Supp. 588, 593 (D. Conn.), aJ'dmem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
99. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
100. 422 U.S. at 761.
101. Id. at 753.
102. Id. at 753-54.
103. Id. at 755. Brief for Appellant at 17 n.13, id.; Brief for Appellee at 42, id.
104. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 963, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rep'd, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
105. 422 U.S. at 785.
106. Id. at.756-62. In the Supreme Court, the Government did not argue that § 405(h) barred
the action entirely, although it had done so in the district court. See Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F.
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jected the district court's reading of section 405(h) as merely a codifica-
tion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.' 0 7 The
Court noted that the language of the third sentence is "sweeping and
direct and. . . states that no action shall be brought under § 1331, not
merely that only those actions shall be brought in which administrative
remedies have been exhausted."'10 8  Distinguishing Johnson v. Rob/-
son,109 the Court also rejected the argument that the claim arose not
under the Social Security Act, as precluded by section 405(h), but
under the Constitution."' In Robison, the statute at issue, 38 U.S.C.
§ 211(a), precluded jurisdiction only as to review of "decisions of the
[Veterans'] Administrator," but did not preclude jurisdiction to review
statutory requirements."' Thus, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) is unlike section
405(h), which by the terms of its third sentence precludes jurisdiction
over any action seeking to recover on any Social Security claim."l2 The
Court also reasoned that, in Robison, it had sought to avoid a statutory
construction that would have precluded constitutional challenges to
statutory limitations, whereas the Social Security Act itself provides a
jurisdictional route under section 405(g) through which claims such as
the plaintilf's in SaXi could be reviewed." 3
Next the Court determined that the requirements of section 405(g)
had in fact been met by the named plaintiff."4 The requirements that
the civil action under section 405(g) be filed within sixty days of the
final administrative decision in a particular district court were deemed
waivable as mere statute of limitation and venue requirements.' '5 Sec-
tion 405(g)'s requirement of a "final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing," was, however, deemed "central to the requisite grant
Supp. 961, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). The Government did argue, however,
that sovereign immunity barred an award of retroactive benefits, Brief for Appellants at 16-19,
and in the course of that argument referred to § 405(h). Id. at 17 n.19. Because the Court re-
versed on the merits, it did not reach the sovereign immunity issue. 422 U.S. at 756.
107. 422 U.S. at 757. Since exhaustion would be fruitless under the circumstances the district
court had held that section 405(h) would not bar this suit.
108. Id. (emphasis in original). Also, since the first two sentences are sufficient to require
administrative exhaustion, the Court reasoned that a limited reading of the third sentence would
render it superfluous. Id. at 757-58. In a footnote, the Court rejected any argument that without
the third sentence, the second sentence, which precludes review of secretarial findings or decisions,
would not assure exhaustion where a district court complaint is filed before an administrative
claim is decided. Id. at 758 n.6. The Court noted that an application was a statutory prerequisite
to eligibility for benefits, and that once filed, even a nonfinal denial "is still a 'decision of the
Secretary' which, by virtue of the second sentence of § 405(h), may not be reviewed save pursuant
to § 405(g)." Id.
109. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
110. 422 U.S. at 760-62.
111. See 415 U.S. at 367-68.
112. See 422 U.S. at 762.
113. Id. at 762-64.
114. Id. at 764-65.
115. Id. at 763-64.
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of subject-matter jurisdiction."'1 6 While reaffirming that a court could
not proceed in the absence of such a final decision on the grounds of
futility, the Court nonetheless reasoned that the Secretary could prop-
erly conclude that full exhaustion of the administrative procedure was
unnecessary, since the definition of "final decision" is "left to the Secre-
tary to flesh out by regulation." '17 In a similar fashion, the Court
found that a prior hearing was not required if the Secretary determined
that a hearing would have been useless."18 The Court then interpreted
the Secretary's failure to raise the jurisdictional issue' 19 as a determina-
tion that he had made the appropriate determinations of finality as to
the named plaintiff, 20 and the Court proceeded to decide the merits of
the claims.
At the time Sa#7 was decided, initial briefs had already been sub-
mitted in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 ' The issue in Eldridge was whether
due process required that the recipient of Social Security disability ben-
efit payments be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing
prior to the termination of such payments. 2 2 The plaintiffs Social Se-
curity disability benefits were terminated when it was determined, fol-
lowing the opportunity for the plaintiff to provide a written response,
that he was no longer disabled.2 3 A hearing and judicial review were
available to him, but during their pendency, benefits would not be
paid. 2 4 Instead of obtaining reconsideration and then a hearing as
provided by the regulations, 25 the plaintiff brought suit in district court
contending that, under Goldberg v. Kely, 126 his benefits could not be
terminated until after the hearing. 27 The district court agreed, order-
ing that his benefits be reinstated pending an evidentiary hearing. 28
The court of appeals affirmed, 29 but the Supreme Court reversed on
the merits. 3
0
In a supplemental brief filed after the SaY decision was rendered,
116. Id. at 764.
117. Id. at 766-67.
118. Id. at 767.
119. See note 106 supra.
120. 422 U.S. at 767. Because there was no allegation that the class members even filed appli-
cations, much less obtained secretarial decisions, final or otherwise, the Court found that § 405(h)
foreclosed jurisdiction over so much of the complaint as concerned the class. Id. at 764.
121. See Brief for Respondent at 1I, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
122. 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
123. Id. at 324.
124. Id. at 323-24.
125. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.710, .820 (1978).
126. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
127. 424 U.S. at 325.
128. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 528 (W.D. Va. 1973), a dper curiam, 493
F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'dsub nom., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
129. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230, 1231 (4th Cir. 1974), rey'dsub nom., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
130. 424 U.S. at 349.
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the Government relied on SaX to argue that section 405(h) precluded
jurisdiction."'3 The Court dealt with this contention, not by concluding
that section 405(h) was inapplicable, but rather by concluding that the
district court had jurisdiction under section 405(g).' 32 The Court rea-
soned that the central jurisdictional requirement of a final decision by
the Secretary after a hearing consisted of both a nonwaivable element,
filing a claim, and a waivable element, a final decision after a hear-
ing. 33 The Court found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the nonwaivable
requirement of filing a claim, 34 and then proceeded to deal with the
waivable element. The Court held that it need not always defer to the
Secretary's determination of finality 35 and refused to do so for two
reasons. First, unlike Saf, the Eldridge plaintiffs constitutional chal-
lenge was "entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitle-
ment." 36  Second, also unlike Salf', if a plaintiff were required to go
through the administrative procedure, even with the possibility of ret-
roactive benefits, his constitutional claims might be lost, since the claim
rested on the very proposition that full relief could not be obtained at a
post-termination hearing. 137 The Court then proceeded on the merits
to hold that the plaintiff had no procedural due process right to a
pretermination oral hearing.' 38
The Eldridge Court expressly refrained from reaching the plain-
tiffs alternative jurisdictional argument that jurisdiction under the
mandamus statute139 or the Administrative Procedure Act [APA]140
131. Petitioner's Supplemental and Reply Brief at 3-10, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). The brief relied not only on the third sentence, but also on the second sentence of
§ 405(h). Id. at 4, 6. The Government argued that the Secretary had determined neither that the
termination decision as to Mr. Eldridge was final, nor that a hearing was unnecessary. Id. at 7-8.
Further, "exhaustion may obviate the need for any judicial review." Id. at 8. The Government
also made the somewhat tortured argument that a finding of no jurisdiction would not forever
preclude judicial review of the constitutional issue raised by the plaintiff. If, after a hearing, the
Secretary were to affin a termination, and if on judicial review under § 405(g) a court were to
reverse on the merits, the court could also, so the theory went, decide the pretermination hearing
issue (although seemingly moot at that point since retroactive benefits would be provided), be-
cause the issue would be "capable of repetition." Id. at 8-10.
The plaintiff argued that § 405(g) provided jurisdiction as in Sax, Respondent's Supplemen-
tal Brief at 6-9, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and, in the alternative that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (mandamus) and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (Administrative Procedure Act) provided jurisdic-
tion and were not precluded by the third sentence of § 405(h). Respondent's Supplemental Brief
at 9-18.
132. 424 U.S. at 328-32.
133. Id. at 329. The distinction was based on the Sal'f Court's dismissal of the class claims, as
to which no allegation had been made that administrative claims had even been filed, and the
Safy Court's acceptance of the individual claim on the basis of secretarial waiver. Id. See note
120 supra.
134. 424 U.S. at 329.
135. Id. at 330.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 331.
138. Id. at 349.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
140. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
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was available, notwithstanding section 405(h) as interpreted in Salfi.'4
The issue was presented with regard to the APA, however, in Ca/ifano
v. Sanders.'42 Sanders involved a Social Security disability claimant
who, after a hearing, had been finally denied benefits in 1966.14 In
1973, he sought reopening as provided by the regulations. 44 The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge denied the request and refused to grant a hear-
ing. ' 4  The claimant then brought suit under section 405(g),
challenging the reopening denial. 46 The district court dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, 47 but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
while there was no jurisdiction under section 405(g), jurisdiction was
present under the APA to review the reopening denial for abuse of dis-
cretion.' 48 The argument that the APA provided an independent basis
of jurisdiction, and was not precluded by the third sentence of
§ 405(h), 14 9 had often been used to find jurisdiction in Social Security
Act cases-particularly in reopening cases-even after Saf.'"
In Sanders, the Government argued before the Supreme Court
that section 405(g) did not provide a basis for jurisdiction and that sec-
tion 405(h) precluded review of the denial of reopening under any
other jurisdictional basis. 5 ' Alternatively, the Government argued
that the APA did not contain an independent grant of subject matter
jurisdiction.' In response, both the plaintiff and an amicus argued
that jurisdiction could be found under section 405(g) in light of. SaX
and Eldridge,15 3 despite the unanimous agreement of the courts of ap-
peals to the contrary.' 54 The Supreme Court found that the APA was
not an independent basis of jurisdiction, 55 and that section 405(g) was
inapplicable. 56 Having found no basis for jurisdiction, the Court re-
versed and did not reach the Government's section 405(h) preclusion
argument. 1
57
141. 424 U.S. at 332 n.12.
142. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
143. Id. at 102.
144. Id. See note 26 supra.
145. 430 U.S. at 103.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'dsub nom., Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
149. This argument is predicated on the fact that the APA is found in title 5 rather than title
28.
150. See Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977);
Gallo v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1976); LeJeune v. Mathews, 526 F.2d 950, 952-
53 (5th Cir. 1976); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975).
151. Brief for Petitioner, at 10-23, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
152. Id. at 23-41.
153. Brief for Respondent at 13-14, 18-20; Brief for Amicus at 5-20.
154. See cases cited in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 n.8 (1977).
155. Id. at 104-07.
156. Id. at 107-09.
157. Id. at 109. In a concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart
A4RIZON4 L,4 REVIEW [Vol. 21
In finding no jurisdiction under section 405(g), the Court noted
that while that section requires a" 'final decision of the Secretary made
after a hearing,' "158 a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be
denied without a hearing, and indeed even if a hearing is granted, that
hearing is afforded by regulation and not by the Act.'59 Moreover, a
finding of jurisdiction would frustrate the congressional purpose be-
hind the sixty-day time limit on judicial review found in section
405(g).160 The Supreme Court expressly rejected plaintiff's contention
that Salfl and Eldridge permitted a broader interpretation of section
405(g). 16 1 While conceding that in those cases jurisdiction was found
despite the absence of a prior section 405(b) hearing, the cases were
distinguished on the ground that they involved constitutional chal-
lenges.162
In view of the judiciary's position within our constitutional scheme
as final adjudicator of constitutional rights and duties, it may be pre-
sumed that Congress will not lightly take the step of precluding juris-
diction over claims involving direct government violations of the
Constitution. On the other hand, where statutory rights and duties are
involved, Congress has the final say. It is, therefore, much more likely
that when Congress precluded jurisdiction to review actions of an
agency for failure to comply with a statute-and afortiori for failure to
comply with its own regulations-it meant what it said. The preclusion
accepted the preclusion argument, reasoning that the second sentence of § 405(h), which, except as
provided by the act, precludes review of secretarial findings and decisions, applied regardless of
which jurisdictional basis was asserted. Id. at 109-11. This conclusion is not required by the
reasoning of SaXY, which explains that the second sentence of § 405(h) serves as a codification of
the equitable requirement of exhaustion of remedies. The conclusion, however, is consistent with
the Salf reasoning. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. at I ll n. (Stewart, J., concurring). The
Sa/§ complaint had alleged jurisdictional bases other than 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see id. at 110, and at
one point the SaNf opinion had stated that sources of jurisdiction other than § 405(g) were fore-
closed by § 405(h). See id. at 110-11 (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 764). The fact that
the majority in Sanders refrained from using this "shorter route" to the conclusion of no jurisdic-
tion, however, might indicate a reluctance to interpret the jurisdiction withdrawing effect of
§ 405(h) so broadly. On the other hand, the Court might have wished, for other reasons, to decide
the APA jurisdiction question once and for all. See K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES vi (Supp. 1976) (criticizing the Court for never having decided the APA jurisdiction
question).




162. Id. at 108-09. The Court stated that
a decision denying § [405(g)] jurisdiction in Salfi or Eldridge would effectively have
closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims. Thus
those cases merely adhered to the well-established principle that when constitutional
questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not
read a statutory scheme to take the "extraordinary" step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless
Congress' intent to do so is manifested by "'clear and convincing'" evidence.
This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary's denial of a petition to
reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds.
Id. at 109. (citations omitted).
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of judicial review, in effect, legislates that Congress will be satisfied
with actions of the agency, notwithstanding other statutory provisions.
Of course, if Congress is dissatisfied, it can amend the Act either to
change substantive provisions or to provide for judicial review. Thus,
it made sense for the Supreme Court to draw a distinction in determin-
ing whether Congress has precluded jurisdiction for judicial review on
the basis of whether constitutional issues are involved.
PROBLEMS WITH THE SALFI-ELDRIDGE-SANDERS LINE
Under SaX, Eldridge, and Sanders, then, jurisdiction in the dis-
trict court over any suit arising out of a Social Security Act title to
which section 405(h) applies is precluded, unless a jurisdictional grant
contained in the Act either applies by its terms or can be loosely inter-
preted when a constitutional issue is raised. This set of criteria works
well in the context of the three cases decided by the Court, and in cer-
tain similar kinds of cases,' 63 but in light of the policies the Court ap-
163. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,72-77 (1976). Diaz was a due process-equal protection
challenge to a Medicare Part B statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1976), denying eligibil-
ity to aliens unless they have been admitted for permanent residence and also have resided in the
country for at least five years. 426 U.S. at 69. The Medicare Act incorporates § 405(g) for the
purpose of determining eligibility for Part B benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(B) (1976). In other
respects, the case was procedurally very similar to SaKf, except that the Secretary challenged juris-
diction over one plaintiff whose application had not been filed prior to suit, and once filed had not
even preliminarily been denied. 426 U.S. at 72. The Court, however, interpreted the Secretary's
stipulation "that no facts were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary judg-
ment, and that the only issue... was the constitutionality of the statute.., as tantamount to a
decision denying the application and as a waiver of the exhaustion requirements." Id. at 76-77.
The Court, as in Saf, found jurisdiction over the named individuals, but found against them on
the merits. Id. at 77, 87.
A series of cases procedurally very similar to Eldridge arose from the replacement of state-
administered federal assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled by SSI. See text & notes 33-36
supra. The SSI statute "grandfathered" persons eligible for the state programs into the SSI pro-
ram unless they did not receive the state aid until the last six months of 1973. See 42 U.S.C.
1382c(a)(3)(E)(1976). For persons in the latter category, "presumptive" disability benefits were
paid pending an SSI eligibility determination, but once such an eligibility determination was
made, benefits were cut off pending a hearing. Id. § 1383(c). In many states, such persons
brought suit challenging the constitutionality under Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), of the
discontinuance of benefits pending a hearing. See, e.g., DeLao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384, 1388
(9th Cir. 1977); Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Mathews, 539
F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 1976). These cases were jurisdictionally very similar to Eldridge: An
ultimate hearing on eligibility was available under § 405(g), see 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (1976),
claims had been fied, the constitutional challenge was collateral to the substantive claim of enti-
tlement and by its very nature would be lost if the plaintiffs were required first to complete the
administrative procedure. The courts accordingly had little difficulty finding jurisdiction under
the Eldridge rationale.
Cases involving the constitutionality of recouping overpayments of Social Security benefits,
by reducing later payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, but without a prerecoupment
hearing to determine whether the beneficiary is entitled to a waiver, also fit the Eldridgejurisdic-
tional mold. Mattern v. Mathews, 582 F.2d 248, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1978); Elliott v. Weinberger, 564
F.2d 1219, 1225-28, 1225 n.8a (9th Cir. 1977), aI§'d on other grounds sub nom. Califano v.
Yamasaki, 99 S. Ct. 2545 (1979). Again, claims were filed and the constitutional challenge was
collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement itself reviewable under § 405(g), which by its very
nature would be lost if the plaintiffs were required first to complete the administrative procedure.
See also Town Court Nursing Center v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1978).
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parently sought to advance, the set of criteria is either overinclusive or
underinclusive in a number of other kinds of Social Security Act cases.
Application of the criteria may result, for instance, in the time and ex-
haustion limits of the Act being circumvented on the one hand, and in
the unavailability of the district courts to hear proper constitutional
due process challenges on the other. Moreover, this reasoning encour-
ages lower courts to distort the meaning of statutory jurisdictional re-
quirements, such as those mi section 405(g), beyond all recognition in
order to find jurisdiction in some cases.
Cases That Might Be Heard But Should Not Be
First, by its dictum regarding challenges on constitutional grounds
in Sanders, the Supreme Court invited persons bringing suit under the
Social Security Act to couch their claims in constitutional terms in or-
der to assert jurisdiction under section 405(g). The Sanders opinion
reasoned that denying section 405(g) jurisdiction in SaXff or Eldridge
would "effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of
colorable constitutional claims."''14 Saf did not interpret section
405(g) in nearly the kind of loose manner used in Eldridge. A holding
of no jurisdiction in Sa/ would have closed the federal forum to Mrs.
Salfi, but would not have closed the federal forum forever to the issue
she sought to raise. The Sa/fi Court clearly contemplated that once the
full administrative procedure had been exhausted, the constitutional is-
sue could have been presented to a court under section 405(g), even if
jurisdiction had not been found in Sa/fi itself.'65 In Eldridge, however,
a finding of no jurisdiction would have precluded anybody from even
obtaining a federal court adjudication of Mr. Eldridge's constitutional
claim. The Court accordingly interpreted section 405(g) very loosely in
Eldridge. By lumping the two situations together in Sanders, the Court
implied that the mere presence of a constitutional issue as in Saf, even
if that issue could be adjudicated in a federal court if properly brought
in another case, would justify the much looser interpretation of section
405(g) found in Eldridge and necessitated there by the fact that denial
of jurisdiction would have closed the federal forum to the adjudication
of the constitutional claim in any case. This interpretation is supported
by the negative implication in Sanders that there would be jurisdiction
under section 405(g) "where the Secretary's denial of a petition to reo-
pen is challenged on constitutional grounds."' 66 If this is so, then a
Social Security disability claimant, in an attempt to reopen a benefit
164. 430 U.S. at 109.
165. See 422 U.S. at 762.
166. 430 U.S. at 109.
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claim denied in the distant past could assert that the original denial was
based on an unconstitutional statute or regulation. Denying jurisdic-
tion in such a case would present no constitutional problem since the
claimant could have raised the constitutional issue at the time of the
initial claim; granting jurisdiction would frustrate the statutory purpose
recognized in Sanders-forestalling belated litigation of old eligibility
claims.
167
While courts might have little trouble disposing of such a case
where a constitutional issue could have been decided in the context of
the initial claim, they might find it more difficult to dispose of chal-
lenges to HEW actions on the reopening claim itself, if the challenge
were couched in constitutional terms. Virtually any claim against the
government can be expressed in constitutional terms, 168 particularly in
the Social Security context, where questions of whether proper proce-
dures or proper entitlement standards were applied, generally involve
resort to regulations. The argument in either case can be cast in terms
of the Secretary's failure to follow his own regulations. Such a failure
is then arguably a violation of due process. 169
Unless the "constitutional issue" exception to the strict require-
ments for jurisdiction under section 405(g) is limited somehow, courts
unsympathetic with the jurisdictional limitations of section 405 will
have little difficulty permitting review contrary to the statutory policy
of rendering claims final. For instance, a court could find that the Sec-
retary violated due process by failing to conform properly to his regula-
tions dealing with reopening.' 70  While jurisdiction in such a case
should not be permitted, there are obviously some kinds of reopening
claims that should be reviewed judicially, such as where the Secretary
refused to reopen on racial grounds.
These considerations suggest, first, that jurisdiction over reopening
denials should be found only when constitutional issues are raised, and
then only if the constitutional issue could not have been raised by re-
167. Id. at 108.
168. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1976) (argument that a person arrested by law
enforcement officers has claim against officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would lead to a conclusion
that any person injured by state official has claim under fourteenth amendment).
169. See Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970). An example of this kind of
phenomenon in the Medicare context is found in Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc. v.
Mathews, 534 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 250
(1978). MacDonald involved a provider challenge to the Secretary's application of his own regu-
lation in determining reimbursement of reasonable costs. Id. at 634. In holding for the provider,
the original panel even suggested that the Secretary could simply change his regulations in order
to achieve his desired result in the future. Id. at 639. By the time the case was reheard and the
jurisdictional difficulties were more apparently dispositive; the plaintiff was asserting that the Sec-
retary's actions in determining reasonable costs for reimbursement constituted an unconstitutional
denial of substantive due process. Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d
328, 329-30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 250 (1978).
170. See note 26 supra.
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view of the original claim. This limitation avoids the possibility of re-
view where a reopening claimant challenges a reopening denial on
grounds that would have applied to the original claim, while permitting
review of constitutional issues relating to the reopening procedure it-
self. Second, the considerations suggest that, as a matter of statutory
construction, "constitutional issues" for these purposes should not in-
clude questions as to whether the Secretary properly followed the Act
or his regulations, as long as the action would have been constitutional
if properly authorized by the Act or his regulations. Unless the excep-
tion for constitutional claims is limited in this manner, it will eventu-
ally engulf the rule and every manner of challenge for violation of
statutes or regulations will be heard, despite a specific preclusion of
jurisdiction. Such a result would render the preclusion of jurisdiction
virtually meaningless.
Similar reasoning was used recently by the Supreme Court in in-
terpreting another statute granting district court jurisdiction. In Chap-
man v. Houston Wefare Rights Organization,'7 the Court held that the
grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) of federal jurisdiction over civil actions to
redress the deprivation under color of state law "'of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States'"
did not extend to actions involving rights secured solely by the
supremacy clause of the Constitution.172 The Court relied on Swift &
Co. v. Wickham,173 which similarly held that language in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 providing for jurisdiction of three-judge courts over suits for
injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes "upon the ground
of the unconstitutionality of such statute" was not intended to include
challenges to state statutes based upon the supremacy clause: "Since
all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment rest ultimately on the
Supremacy Clause, the words 'upon the ground of the unconstitutional-
ity of such statute' would appear to be superfluous unless they are read
to exclude some types of such injunctive suits.' 1 74
The Chapman Court reasoned, by analogy, that "the entire refer-
ence in § 1343(3) to rights secured by an act of Congress would be un-
necessary if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced
those resting solely on the Supremacy Clause."' 175 The Court accord-
ingly concluded that "it would make little sense for Congress to have
drafted the statute as it did if it had intended to confer jurisdiction over
171. 99 S. Ct. 1905 (1979).
172. Id. at 1911.
173. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
174. Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
175. 99 S. Ct. at 1914.
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every conceivable federal claim against a state agent.' 76
It would similarly make little sense for Congress to have drafted
the Social Security Act to preclude jurisdiction in nonconstitutional
claim cases, but not in constitutional claim cases, if it meant to include
within the latter category virtually all Social Security Act cases. Yet
that is the result if the category of constitutional claim cases includes all
cases in which agency actions are challenged only for a failure to follow
statutes or regulations, as opposed to the Constitution itself. It is there-
fore evident that the "constitutional issues" exception to the strict re-
quirements for jurisdiction in Social Security Act cases, as a matter of
statutory construction, should not extend to review of whether the Sec-
retary properly followed the Act or his regulations, as long as the action
if so authorized would have been constitutional.
For instance, review should not be permitted of a reopening denial
where a claimant asserted that he had new and material evidence or
where it is asserted that there was an error as to the first determination
on the face of the evidence, even though the regulations define such
circumstances as "good cause" for reopening.' 77 In addition, review
should not be permitted if the constitutionality of the procedures used
in the first determination is challenged on application for reopening,
since those constitutional issues could have been raised on judicial re-
view of the first denial. On the other hand, a constitutional violation
such as a denial of reopening on the basis of sex, or on the basis of a
reopening regulation which itself is unconstitutional, should be review-
able.
The limitation of the "constitutional issues" exception in reopen-
ing cases to issues that could not have been raised by the initial claim,
and to issues other than those involving whether the Secretary properly
followed the Act or regulations, would be consistent with Sanders. In
that case, the Court characterized as "rare" those instances where the
Secretary's denial of a petition to reopen may be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds. 17  This standard would also effectively implement
the policy implemented in SafY of precluding court review even of con-
stitutional issues when a means of raising the issues through the admin-
istrative process was available. 7 9
Cases That Cannot Be Heard In The District Court But Should Be
On the other hand, there are numerous cases, arising primarily
176. Id.
177. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957(b), .958 (1978).
178. 430 U.S. at 109.
179. 422 U.S. at 762.
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under the Medicare Act, in which constitutional due process and equal
protection issues are raised, but where there is no basis for district court
jurisdiction to review such cases, even under an Eldridge analysis. The
reason is that the Eldridge analysis relies on the availability at some
point of jurisdiction under section 405(g): Eldridge permitted jurisdic-
tion over a constitutional claim collateral to a substantive claim of enti-
tlement which itself was ultimately reviewable under section 405(g). 180
Apart from the policy reasons for finding jurisdiction, the means for
finding jurisdiction was an analysis that a final administrative decision
had been made, and that it was reviewable under section 405(g).' 8'
This analysis is impossible in certain other kinds of cases. The Medi-
care Act, for instance, incorporates section 405(g) only for limited pur-
poses.182 Among the Medicare cases where the Act simply provides no
basis for judicial review are all claims by provider hospitals for pre-
1972 periods, 83 all claims under Part B except those dealing with
whether the plaintiff is eligible to enroll or has enrolled, 8 4 and all ben-
eficiary claims for less than the jurisdictional amount. 85 Even under
OASDI there are circumstances where it is impossible for section
405(g) to be construed as applicable, such as where it is not the benefi-
ciary who is suing, or where the subject of the challenge cannot in any
sense be called a decision, as where the challenge is made to assertedly
illegal hearing delays. In particular, courts have struggled with the is-
sue of whether there is jurisdiction in light of section 405(g), as inter-
preted by Salf, Eldridge, and Sanders, in the following kinds of cases:
(1) Due process challenges by provider hospitals to administra-
tive reimbursement procedures;18 6
(2) provider challenges to the constitutionality of regulations
dealing with the amount of reimbursement under Part A;187
180. 424 U.S. at 332.
181. Id. at 330-31.
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff, 1395pp(d) (1976); text & notes 60-94 supra.
183. See text & note 63 supra.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(B) (1976).
185. Id. § 1395ff(b) (2).
186. See, e.g., Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. Califano, 587 F.2d 762, 763 (5th Cir. 1979) (challenge
to failure to hold hearings in connection with recoupment of funds for uncovered services under
Part A); Trinity Memorial Hosp. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 570 F.2d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir.
1977) (whether provider hearings on reasonable cost disputes under Part A failed to satisfy due
process requirements because employees of the fiscal intermediary sat on the appeals committee);
St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 291-92 (8th Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S.
977 (1976); Overlook Nursing Home, Inc., v. United States, 556 F.2d 500, 502-504 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347, 352-53 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969
(1977).
187. See, e.g., Adams Nursing Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1078-80 (1st Cir. 1977)
(due process challenge to regulation providing for recapture of the difference between accelerated
and straight line depreciation of assets used to serve Medicare patients when providers using the
accelerated method left the program); Springdale Convalescent Center v. Mathews, 545 F.2d 943,
947-51 (5th Cir. 1977); Hazelwood Chronic and Convalescent Center v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 703
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(3) provider challenges to the statutory validity of Medicare reg-
ulations or to acts of the Secretary under the Medicare Act;18 8
(4) provider challenges to acts of the Secretary as inconsistent
with his own regulations or otherwise incorrect; 189
(5) physician challenges to regulations governing providers
under Part A, 190 to regulations governing reimbursement of physicians
under Part B, 19 1 or to particular acts of the Secretary; 19z
(6) challenges to delays in the provision of hearings under
OASDI and SSI, based on the Act, the APA, and the Constitution; 193
and
(7) statutorily based challenged by unions, local governments, or
taxpayers to the continuance of an agreement applying OASDI to local
government employees. 194
In some of these cases, a holding of no jurisdiction to review is
reasonable because of the availability, as in Sa i, of another means of
obtaining judicial review of the same issues following initial resort to
the agency. Of course, the alternate route might be relatively burden-
some, but this is an insufficient reason to allow it to be avoided. For
(9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 430.U.S. 952 (1977); South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Ma-
thews, 541 F.2d 910, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1976).
188. See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (provider
challenge to reasonable cost regulation as invalidly promulgated under the APA, as contrary to
the Medicare Act, and as a violation of due process); Association of Am. Medical Colleges v.
Califano, 569 F.2d 101, 106-08 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (challenge to reasonable cost regulation as incon-
sistent with the Medicare Act); Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 336-67 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (challenge to HEW's right to recoup payments for
uncovered services); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 8, 11-12 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (chal-
lenge to rule for failure to comply with APA requirements).
189. See, e.g., Hospital San Jorge, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 598 F.2d 684 (1st Cir. 1979);
Trinity Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv, Inc., 570 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1977); Dr.
John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc. v. Mathews, 534 F.2d 633, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated,
571 F.2d 328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 250 (1978); Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v. United
States, 556 F.2d 500, 504-06 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31, 34 (Ct. CL.
1978).
190. See, e.g., American Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs of Private Hosps., Inc. v.
Califano, 575 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1018 (1979).
191. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Califano, 600 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1979) (optometrists' challenge to
exclusion of optometric services from Part B coverage); St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.,
537 F.2d 283, 290 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (challenge to regulations concerning
compensation for physician's services under Part B as contrary to the statutory requirement of
reimbursement of "reasonable charges" under § 13951); Galo v. Mathews, 534 F.2d 1137, 1139-40
(5th Cir. 1976) (challenge to HEW's right to recoup payments for uncovered services); Szekely v.
Florida Medical Ass'n, 517 F.2d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1975).
192. See, e.g., Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (Ist Cir. 1978) (physician
sought reimbursement under Part B rather than Part A).
193. See, e.g., Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1978); Blankenship v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1978); Casewell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir.
1978); Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 856
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
194. See, e.g., Lowther v. Montgomery County, 561 F.2d 1120, 1121-22 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978); Baker v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 835 (1977). See also RoAne v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1976).
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instance, in Association ofAmerican Medical Colleges v. Calfano,195 an
association of providers challenged as contrary to the Medicare Act 96
the substance of HEW regulations fixing limits on reimbursement of
costs incurred by providers. 97 Following SaXfi and Sanders, and dis-
tinguishing Eldridge, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had no jurisdiction. 9 ' The court relied on the availability of
a PRRB hearing and subsequent judicial review, 199 despite the fact that
such hearings can occur only after the services have been rendered. 00
On the other hand, Congress probably did not intend to preclude
district court review in many of these cases which present clear consti-
tutional due process issues. For instance, in Alabama HospitalAssocia-
tion v. Calfano,20 1 a group of provider hospitals, from whom
overpayments for pre-1972 services had been recouped by HEW, con-
tended that they were constitutionally entitled to a hearing at some
point during or after the recoupment process.202 The claim appears to
meet the Eldridge requirement of being a colorable constitutional claim
which is at no point otherwise meaningfully reviewable in court. Nev-
ertheless, since the merits of the providers' various claims are not judi-
cially reviewable under section 405(g) or a comparable provision, the
actual Eldridge analysis of finding a final decision on the collateral con-
stitutional claim under section 405(g) is impossible. The district court
was therefore precluded by the Salfl-Eldridge-Sanders line from decid-
ing a clear constitutional due process issue. 03
A similar problem has arisen in suits challenging as violative of
due process the presence of fiscal intermediaries' representatives on
hearing panels determining reasonable cost issues for pre-1972 peri-
ods.2 °4
It is also difficult to apply the Salfl-Eldridge-Sanders line to certain
cases outside of the Medicare Act. For instance, several cases have
challenged the great delays by HEW in providing statutorily mandated
hearings for persons claiming disability or SSI benefits.2 05 To the ex-
tent that these cases are based upon the Constitution, they meet the
Eldridge requirements of raising a colorable constitutional claim that is
195. 569 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (1976).
197. 569 F.2d at 103.
198. Id. at 108.
199. Id. at 110. See text & note 66 supra.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A) (1976).
201. 587 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979).
202. Id. at 763.
203. Id. The Fifth Circuit transferred the case to the Court of Claims. Id. at 764. As to the
propriety of this action, see text accompanying notes 230-73 infra.
204. See cases cited in note 186 supra.
205. See cases cited in note 193 supra.
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not otherwise open to meaningful judicial review. Yet Eldridge, by its
terms, is inapplicable since it rests on the assumption that the Secretary
has made a final decision on an issue that is collateral to a judicially
reviewable issue under section 405(g). Here the issue is indeed collat-
eral to a judicially reviewable one, but in no meaningful sense has the
Secretary made a "decision" when all there has been is a delay. The
holdings of Salfi, Eldridge, and Sanders thus would preclude jurisdic-
tion.206
HOW THE LOWER COURTS HAVE AVOIDED THE RIGOR OF THE
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In the types of cases just described, courts have strained to avoid
holding that certain constitutional due process issues are unreviewable
in the federal courts. The simplest way has been to assume jurisdiction
and to hold for the government. In effect, the First Circuit opted for
this course in Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW. °7 Dr. Cervoni was a hos-
pital based physician who sought reimbursement under Part B of the
Medicare Act, for physicians' services, rather than under Part A, for
hospital services.20 The court found that there was no jurisdiction
under the Medicare Act, and that section 405(h) precluded jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, unless, perhaps, a colorable constitutional
claim was raised.2"9 Then, without deciding "whether § 405(h) should
be read as a bar to constitutional claims involving due process in the
instant case,"' 210 the court simply held that no constitutional issue was
raised, on the ground that Dr. Cervoni had no property interest in re-
imbursement under Part B rather than Part A.2"
The Supreme Court's attitude toward assuming jurisdiction in or-
der to hold for the government in Social Security Act cases has been
ambivalent. In Norton v. Mathews, 212 the Supreme Court assumed ju-
risdiction to affirm a decision on a constitutional issue in favor of the
government, where the government had challenged the jurisdiction of
the three-judge court and thus the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.21 3
The Court relied on the fact that it had decided the constitutional issue
on the merits in favor of the government in a companion case over
206. But see Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1978); Wright v.
Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 348-50 (7th Cir. 1978); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 13-15 (1st Cir.
1978).
207. 581 F.2d 1010 (Ist Cir. 1978). See also Hospital San Jorge, Inc., v. Secretary of HEW,
598 F.2d 684 (Ist. Cir. 1979).
208. 581 F.2d at 1011.
209. Id. at 1017.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1019.
212. 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
213. Id. at 532-33.
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which it clearly had jurisdiction. 214 But on a claimant's petition for
certiorari in Hazelwood Chronic & Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v.
Calfano,21 5 the Court vacated a judgment of the court of appeals in
favor of the government on the merits of a constitutional issue and re-
manded for reconsideration of the lower court's jurisdiction under
Sanders.2 16
Whatever the value of assuming jurisdiction in order to hold in
favor of the government on the merits in particular cases, it is jurispru-
dentially unsound as a general practice.21 7 Analytically, of course, as-
suming jurisdiction for this purpose puts the cart before the horse.
While such inverted analysis might promote judicial economy in many
cases, as a general approach to avoiding a jurisdictional conundrum, it
results in an unfair tilt in favor of the government. The effect is that, in
certain cases, the courts have jurisdiction only to hold for the govern-
ment. Assuming jurisdiction is especially inappropriate where the issue
on the merits is complex or difficult. 218 A general solution to the prob-
lem of no jurisdiction for certain Social Security Act constitutional
cases can therefore not be found in a series of ad hoc decisions in favor
of the government on the merits.
A second means of avoiding section 405(h) has been to rely on the
Mandamus and Venue Act,219 which provides: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of manda-
mus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. ' 220 Thus, in
suits challenging the recoupment of Social Security overpayments with-
out a prerecoupment hearing, the Ninth Circuit has relied on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361,221 as the Second Circuit has in suits challenging delays in the
provision of hearings.222 While the Supreme Court has not yet re-
solved the issue,223 it appears clear that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 is precluded by the third sentence of section 405(h). There is no
reason to treat 28 U.S.C. § 1361 in a different manner than 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, since the third sentence of section 405(h) precludes actions
214. Id.
215. 430 U.S. 952 (1977).
216. Id. at 952.
217. See generally Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arpuendo: The Rationale and Limits of
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. Rav. 712 (1979).
218. See Id. at 741-42, 748-54.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
220. Id.
221. See Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1225-28 (9th Cir. 1977), a 'don other grounds
sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 99 S. Ct. 
2545 (1979).
222. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978).
223. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 99 S. Ct. 2545 (1979); Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 529-
30 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 n.12 (1976).
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"brought under [section 41] of title 28 to recover on any claim arising
under this subchapter." 24 As the Supreme Court stated in Sali, "At
the time § 405(h) was enacted ...§ 41 contained all of [title 28's]
grants of jurisdiction to United States district courts, save for several
special-purpose jurisdictional grants ... .
The District of Columbia Circuit has accepted this reasoning, but
has limited it to cases in which other statutory procedures authorize
review of the particular action.226 While it may be proper to interpret
jurisdictional preclusion language more loosely when there are no
other means to review a colorable constitutional claim, it is stretching
statutory interpretation to the breaking point to contend that the term
"section 41 of title 28" both does and does not incorporate 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, depending upon whether, in a particular case, there is an alter-
native means of review. There is no rational way to intepret the words
both ways. Such a conclusion is result oriented and bears no relation to
the theoretical basis for construing jurisdictional language more loosely
in some constitutional cases-the intent of Congress. It follows, then,
that 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is either precluded by section 405(h) or it is not.
Since the holding of Sa4#' and the effect of the third sentence of section
405(h) would be largely eviscerated by a holding that section 1361 is
not precluded, the required conclusion is that it is precluded.
The third sentence of section 405(h) would be largely eviscerated
because, although the federal courts have long stated that mandamus is
an extraordinary remedy, "to be employed only under exceptional cir-
cumstances," 227 the courts have been increasingly willing to apply man-
damus to a federal official where the allegation is simply that the
official has a nondiscretionary duty. Thus, the Third Circuit reasoned:
The complexity and novelty of the issues on the merits ... do not
necessarily deprive the federal courts of mandamus jurisdiction. A
determination with respect to jurisdiction involves a threshold in-
quiry into whether the plaintiff has alleged a cause of action under
the particular jurisdictional statute. Here, plaintiff alleges that the
due process clause imposes an obligation on the Secretary to provide
224. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
225. 422 U.S. at 756 n.3. In the 1948 recodification of title 28, a new chapter 85 was created to
contain the jurisdictional grants to the district courts. Pursuant to the 1948 amendments, chapter
85 contained new sections 1331 through 1359 of title 28, which were formerly found in substance
in the old § 41. In 1948, the mandamus statute was not included in chapter 85 because it had not
been enacted yet. Chapter 85 of title 28 was amended in 1962 to include the mandamus statute.
Since 28 U.S.C. § 1361 merely constituted an addition to the list of bases for district court jurisdic-
tion which are found in title 28 and precluded in toto by § 405(h), it follows, as a matter of statu-
tory construction, that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is precluded as well by the third
sentence of § 405(h).
226. See Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Califano, 569 F.2d 101, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
227. Id. at 110 n.80; Cervoni v. Secretary of HEW, 581 F.2d 1010, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1978)
(collecting cases); Oretego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975) (collecting cases).
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her with an oral hearing before adjusting her benefits. Thus, the duty
alleged involves no element of discretion or room for judgment on
the part of the Secretary, and if we agree with plaintiffs contention
on the merits, the result will be to place the Secretary under a bind-
ing, nondiscretionary duty to provide a prerecoupment oral hearing.
Furthermore, the fact that the existence of the duty may become ab-
solutely clear only after an interpretation of the due process clause
and a consideration of the merits of the case does not deprive us of
mandamus jurisdiction. Acceptance of the Secretary's reasoning
would lead to an oddly circular result-if mandamus jurisdiction
were unavailable because, prior to ruling on the merits, the Secre-
tary's duty is not clear, then a court would never have jurisdiction to
determine whether his duty was clear in the first place.228
Since many, if not most, Social Security Act claims can be couched in
terms of a failure on the part of HEW to comply with its regulations,
the Act, or the Constitution, and since compliance by the Secretary
with his own regulations, as with the Act and the Constitution, is a
nondiscretionary duty,229 all manner of claims would have to be heard
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, without the preclusive effect of the third sen-
tence of section 405(h). For instance, a claimant might assert that the
Secretary has denied disability benefits although he or she is assertedly
disabled under the Act and the regulations. If, as the Third Circuit
opinion would indicate, a determination on the merits is appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to determine if in fact the Secretary has a duty
to award benefits, then allowance of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 would permit jurisdiction in precisely the kind of case that sec-
tion 405(h) was most likely intended to preclude; that is, cases involv-
ing the application of statutes or regulations to a particular set of facts,
where no judicial review is expressly provided. Since this cannot have
been the intent of Congress, it follows that jurisdiction under the Man-
damus and Venue Act is, like all other grants of district court jurisdic-
tion in title 28, precluded by the third sentence of section 405(h).
A third method of avoiding the preclusive effect of section 405(h)
in Medicare provider suits has been to lind jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 in the Court of Claims. This route was suggested by the Second
Circuit2 30 and has been adopted by the Court of Claims in numerous
Medicare provider reimbursement disputes. 231 The Fifth Circuit has
228. Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. Mathews v.
Mattern, 425 U.S. 987 (1976). See Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). See generally French, The Frontiers ofhe Federal Mandamus Statute,
21 VILL. L. REv. 637 (1974).
229. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974) (collecting cases).
230. South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1976).
231. Appalachian Regional Hosps., Inc. v. United States, 576 F.2d 858, 861-64 (Ct. CI. 1978);
Gosman v. United States, 573 F.2d 31, 34 (Ct. CI. 1978); Summit Nursing Home, Inc. v. United
States, 572 F.2d 737, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Ulman v. United States, 558 F.2d 1, 3 (Ct. CI. 1977); St.
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transferred two such cases directly to the Court of Claims, although it
sounds less than completely convinced that the Court of Claims has
such jurisdiction. 32 Such an escape route, however, fails to withstand
scrutiny.
The Court of Claims laid out its rationale for asserting jurisdiction
in provider suits in Whiteclif, Inc. v. United States.233 Whitecliff, a
Medicare provider, had instituted a work measurement program which
purportedly revealed that its actual Medicare costs for 1967 through
1970 exceeded the reimbursement received from HEW.234  After a
hearing, a Provider Appeals Committee [PAC] 235 denied the claim.
Whitecliff then brought suit in the Court of Claims, challenging the
decision on the merits as inconsistent with the Medicare Act, and chal-
lenging the composition of the PAC as inconsistent with constitutional
due process. 236 The Court of Claims held that it had jurisdiction to
exercise judicial review "at least for compliance with the Constitution
and the governing statute. '237 The court rather cavalierly assumed that
the Supreme Court would not "extend the Sapi interpretation of Sec-
tion 405(h) to Medicare cases, where the consequences would be so
dramatically different. 238
The conclusion that section 405(h) would not preclude Court of
Claims jurisdiction is otherwise supportable, however, on the theory
that the second sentence of section 405(h) does not preclude jurisdic-
tion but rather codifies the equitable requirement of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies239 and that the third sentence of section 405(h)
precludes only district court jurisdiction. The statutory grant of Court
of Claims jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, has never been part of "sec-
tion 41 of Title 28. '' 24' The difficulty with Court of Claims jurisdiction
over Medicare provider reimbursement disputes thus does not at least
directly arise from section 405(h).
The Court of Claims, however, does not have a valid statutory ba-
Elizabeth Hosp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 8, 11 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v.
United States, 556 F.2d 500, 502 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347, 351
(Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
232. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. Califano, 587 F.2d 762, 763 (5th Cir. 1979); Dr. John T. Mac-
Donald Foundation, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 250
(1978). See also Pushkin v. Califano, 600 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1979); American Ass'n of Councils of
Medical Staffs of Private Hosps., Inc. v. Califano, 575 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 1018 (1979).
233. 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
234. Id. at 349.
235. Such committees were provided by regulation for periods prior to 1972. For later peri-
ods, the statutory Provider Reimbursement Review Board scheme was applicable. See text &
notes 63-67 supra.
236. 536 F.2d at 349.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 351.
239. See note 157 supra.
240. See text & notes 224-25 supra.
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sis for exercising jurisdiction over most of these disputes in the first
place. In this regard the Whitec4!f court merely stated: "In this court,
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (the Tucker Act) is the pertinent jurisdictional provi-
sion both because of plaintiff's contract with the Government and also
because the Medicare legislation, fairly read, mandates appropriate
payment to providers."241
The "contract with the Government," however, is not the legal ba-
sis for the Secretary's obligation to reimburse providers. In order to
become eligible to participate in the Medicare program as a qualified
provider of Medicare services, the Medicare Act specifically requires
that a medical facility file "an agreement" that it will not charge Medi-
care beneficiaries more than prescribed amounts.242 If the "agreement"
satisfies the Act and the facility meets the other conditions of eligibility,
it becomes a qualified Medicare provider and is thereafter entitled by
statute to compensation for services provided to Medicare benefi-
ciaries.243 While the Secretary's legal obligation to reimburse the pro-
vider derives solely from section 1395g, the amount of reimbursement
is determined pursuant to section 1395x(v)(1), which specifically dele-
gates to the Secretary the authority to define the "reasonable cost" of
provider services.2'
Provider reimbursement suits are therefore not "founded . . .
upon an express of implied contract with the United States"2 45 within
the meaning of the Tucker Act, because the Secretary's legal obligation
to reimburse the provider results solely from the Medicare statute.246
The agreement submitted by providers, which the statute requires, is
not a contract. It does not constitute a meeting of the minds or an
exchange of consideration since the Secretary is required by the Act,
and not by the agreement, to reimburse the provider. The agreement
does not even purport to obligate the Secretary to reimburse the pro-
vider. Instead, it is a statutorily required statement that requirements
241. 536 F.2d at 351 (citation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) provides in part:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against
the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
.. . In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to remand appro-
priate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it
may deem proper and just.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (1976).
243. Id. § 1395g(a).
244. Id. § 1395f(b). For post-1972 periods, the amount of reimbursement may be the "cus-
tomary charges" if less, id. § 1395f(b)(l), and in the case of certain services provided for free, the
Secretary may determine by regulation items for reimbursement which "will provide fair com-
pensation." Id. § 1395f(b)(2). Moreover, to the extent a provider's claim is based on a benefici-
ary's entitlement, that also is determined by the Secretary in accordance with his regulations. Id.
§ 1395ff(a).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (1976).
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for participation in the program will be adhered to.2"7 Since there ex-
ists no express or implied contract with the government, jurisdiction in
the Court of Claims must be based, if at all, upon an entitlement meet-
ing the strict requirements for a noncontractual claim under the Tucker
Act.
In order for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction over noncon-
tractual claims in which the plaintiff asserts that money due has not
been paid, "the allegation must be that the particular provision of law
relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to
be paid a certain sum. ' 248 In United States v. Testan,2"9 the Supreme
Court made clear that Court of Claims jurisdiction was so limited.
In Testan, two federal government employees claimed that, under
the Classification Act,25° they were entitled to be classified one grade
higher.251 The Civil Service Commission denied reclassification, and
the employees brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking an order
directing reclassification and backpay.252 The Court of Claims granted
relief by ordering the Commission to reconsider its decision, and indi-
cated that if the Commission were to determine that it had made an
erroneous classification, that determination "could create a legal right
which we could then enforce by a money judgment. '253 The Supreme
Court reversed.25" It held that the Tucker Act, alone, was insufficient
to support the court's action; an additional substantive right to money
damages must be found.2 5 The Court failed to find this substantive
right in the Classification Act, even though that Act provided an as-
serted legal right to reclassification, because the Act nowhere provided
for entitlement to backpay (a certain sum).256 Proper relief would re-
quire resort to mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 in a district court.25 7
A similar analysis applies in the provider reimbursement suits that
have been brought in or transferred to the Court of Claims. Many of
these suits challenge, on constitutional or statutory grounds, the proce-
247. Compare the use of the term "agreement" in § 1395cc with the use of the term "contract"
in the provision in Part B for the Secretary to enter into "contracts" with carriers to administer
Part B. Id. § 1395u(a). "Contracts with carriers" to administer Part B are exempt from competi-
tive bidding. Id. § 1395u(b)(1). The absence of such language with respect to provider agree-
ments further indicates the noncontractual nature of such agreements.
248. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967). See Sanders v.
United States, 594 F.2d 804, 809 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
249. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
250. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1976).
251. 424 U.S. at 393.
252. Id.
253. Testan v. United States, 499 F.2d 690, 691 (Ct. CL. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
254. 424 U.S. at 407.
255. Id. at 397-98.
256. Id. at 399-400.
257. Id. at 399-403.
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dures used by the Secretary in determining reimbursement.258 Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit has anomalously held that the Court of Claims has
jurisdiction only in such inadequate procedure cases.259 It is impossible
to conclude that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to decide these
issues, since a decision in favor of a plaintiff can only result in further
procedures; there would be no automatic payment. Any relief would
thus clearly be of the mandamus type, which, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to grant.260 A
legal right to different procedures in determining Medicare reimburse-
ment, like the asserted legal right to reclassification in Teslan, is not the
same as a right to "actual, presently due money damages."26 The
Court of Claims accordingly has no jurisdiction in such cases.
It is also doubtful whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction in
other provider reimbursement cases. In suits challenging the Secre-
tary's regulations determining the amount of reimbursement,262 if the
regulations are ultimately held to be inconsistent with the statute or the
Constitution, the proper remedy, rather than awarding money dam-
ages, would be mandamus-type relief to invalidate the present regula-
tions and, perhaps, to compel the Secretary to issue new regulations.263
Again, such relief cannot be awarded by the Court of Claims. 264
This leaves those cases in which a provider simply challenges the
Secretary's application of his regulations to the facts of a particular
case.265 Even in these cases, the Act does not require payment until the
Secretary has determined the proper amount to be paid under his regu-
lations. Section 1395g provides that "[t]he Secretary shall periodically
determine the amount which should be paid under this part to each
provider of services with respect to the services furnished by it." 266
Since there is no statutory entitlement to reimbursement prior to a
HEW determination, the most a court could do, then, is order the Sec-
retary to make a redetermination. Again, Testan would preclude Court
of Claims jurisdiction.
Of course section 1395g could be loosely read to require payment
of sums properly determined under the Secretary's regulations, and
thus read as a mandate to pay a certain sum. There is no constitutional
258. See cases cited note 186 supra.
259. Trinity Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., 570 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir.
1977).
260. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-
3 (1969).
261. 424 U.S. at 398.
262. See cases cited notes 187-88 supra.
263. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 670 (2d. Cir. 1973).
264. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 407 (1976).
265. See cases cited note 189 supra.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (1976).
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impetus for such a construction, however, in cases simply involving the
application of regulations to particular fact situations.267 Moreover, the
intent of Congress, as expressed in the second sentence of section
405(h), militates against such a construction. While that sentence may
not be a jurisdictional preclusion,268 the words "[n]o findings of fact or
decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or
governmental agency except as herein provided"2 69 at least indicate
that Congress did not intend, by section 1395g, to waive sovereign im-
munity so as to permit Court of Claims review of ordinary reimburse-
ment decisions of the Secretary, since the Social Security Act nowhere
provides for review of any secretarial decisions in the Court of Claims.
In any event, Court of Claims jurisdiction is an unsuitable solution
to the problem of lack of jurisdiction in provider reimbursement dis-
putes involving constitutional issues. First, Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion is burdensome on plaintiffs located far from Washington, D.C.
Second, Court of Claims jurisdiction is an overbroad solution, permit-
ting Court of Claims jurisdiction not only in constitutional cases, but
also in ordinary reimbursement disputes.27° Third, Congress has never
indicated that the Court of Claims would have a role in the Medicare
judicial review scheme. Instead, it has always placed review of secreta-
rial decisions under the Social Security Act in the district courts.2  In
particular, to the extent the Act does provide for judicial review of deci-
sions involving providers, such review has been in the district court.272
It would therefore be anomalous to assume that whenever Congress did
not provide for jurisdiction to review secretarial decisions, it meant by
silence to put such review in the Court of Claims. Finally, in the class
of cases for which the section 405(h) preclusion of review poses the
greatest difficulty-cases involving the constitutionality of HEW proce-
dures--the Court of Claims is a singularly ill-suited forum. The pur-
pose of the Court of Claims is to award money; it was not intended to
have the function of directing the reform of unconstitutional proce-
dures. The court, accordingly, has no injunctive powers with which to
do so.273 Consequently, Court of Claims jurisdiction is not the answer
to section 405(h) preclusion of colorable constitutional claims brought
by Medicare providers.
267. See cases cited note 189 supra.
268. See note 157 supra.
269. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
270. See note 189 supra.
271. See text & notes 27, 36, 60-72 supra.
272. Thus, review of any determination of whether a facility is entitled to provider status has
always been reviewable in the district court, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c) (1976) and the 1972 amendment
providing for a PRRB applicable to post-1972 periods, provides for review of the PRRB in the
district court. Id. §§ 1395oo(f), 1395pp(d).




Since neither mandamus nor Court of Claims jurisdiction effec-
tively solves the problems with the SaXf-Eldridge-Sanders line, another
solution, based upon statutory interpretation, is desirable. Most of the
difficulties with the line would be eliminated, and the important juris-
diction-precluding effects of section 405(h) maintained, if the words
"any claim arising under this subchapter" in the third sentence of sec-
tion 405(h) were interpreted not to include colorable constitutional
claims that could not have been reviewed previously by a court and
that cannot subsequently be reviewed meaningfully by a court under
the Act.274 For the reasons discussed earlier,27  "colorable constitu-
tional claims" for the purposes of this particular statutory interpreta-
tion would not include claims that the Secretary failed to follow his
regulations or the Act.
Although it is true that the Supreme Court in SaX rejected a nar-
row interpretation of the words "any claim arising under [title II of the
Social Security Act]," '2 76 in SaXfl the contested constitutional issue could
have been raised administrittively and reviewed judicially under the
Act.277 Under the proposed interpretation, a colorable constitutional
claim would "arise under" the Social Security Act unless the Act pro-
vides no means for review of such a claim. It makes more sense to say
that a constitutional claim arises under the Social Security Act if the
Act provides a means for the constitutional issue to be decided than in
cases where there is no such provision. While this interpretation might
not be intuitively obvious, it is certainly less strained than the Eldridge
Court's interpretation of the words "final decision" and "after a hear-
ing" in section 405(g). 27 8 Indeed, the proposed interpretation of section
405(h) does exactly what Eldridge did: interpret statutory language to
provide jurisdiction to review constitutional issues that would other-
wise be unreviewable in the district courts. By slightly limiting the in-
274. The interpretation would be inapplicable where a constitutional issue could have been
raised in a particular case were it not for the failure of a claim to exceed the jurisdictional amount
requirements of§ 1395ff(b)(2) ($1000 for beneficiaries seeking Part A benefits) or § 1395oo(a)(2),
(b) ($10,000 for individual provider cost appeals for post-1972 periods, $50,000 for group provider
cost appeals for post 1972-periods). Congress obviously intended to preclude jurisdiction in those
cases where a specific jurisdictional amount is relevant and unmet. Since a constitutional issue
raised ini a case where the jurisdictional amount is not met could subsequently be raised in a case
where the amount is met, there is far less constitutional difficulty with precluding the claim.
Of course, where a constitutional challenge is made to the jurisdictional amount limit itself,
the foregoing consideration does not apply, since there is no way that a claimant who meets the
jurisdictional amount can have standing to challenge the jurisdictional amount requirement. In
such a case, § 405(h) should not be read to preclude jurisdiction of the constitutional claim. See
Gray Panthers v. Califano, 466 F. Supp. 1317, 1322-26 (D.D.C. 1979).
275. See text & notes 168-78 supra.
276. 422 U.S. at 760. See text & note 110 supra.
277. See text & notes 114-20 supra.
278. See text & note 133 supra.
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terpretation of the section 405(h) preclusion, rather than loosening the
interpretation of the jurisdictional grant, the proposed interpretation
would alleviate the problem of the preclusion of jurisdiction over con-
stitutional claims in some additional cases not before the Court in El-
dridge, cases in which section 405(g) is simply unavailable. 79
The Eighth Circuit arrived at a very similar conclusion in St. Louis
University v. Blue Cross Hospital Service.28 In that case, a hospital
challenged the Secretary's refusal to pay full "reasonable charges,"
under Part B, for the component of radiology services representing
radiologists' services.2 8 ' Because the hospital, prior to the enactment of
the Medicare Act, had not set forth physician's services separately in its
billing, the Secretary, acting through the carrier, limited reimbursement
to the pro rata portion of the salary paid by the hospital to all its radi-
ologists. 28 2 Because a pre-1972 period was involved, the administrative
hearing was provided by a Provider Appeals Committee.2 3 When the
hospital lost the appeal before the PAC, it brought suit on three
grounds: The decision on the merits violated the Act and regulations;
the makeup of the PAC violated constitutional due process; and consti-
tutional equal protection rights were violated because HEW processed
essentially identical claims of other providers differently.284 The
Eighth Circuit held that the carrier's decision was unreviewable be-
cause of section 405(h), and did not reach the equal protection claim. 28 5
The court did decide the due process claim,28 6 on the theory that sec-
tion 405(h) did not preclude jurisdiction because the claim did not
"arise under" the Social Security Act. The Eighth Circuit distinguished
Saft, where a constitutional challenge was held to arise under the So-
cial Security Act, on the ground that the Social Security Act itself pro-
vided jurisdiction for the constitutional challenges raised in SalY.
In the present case, the due process claim has as its primary goal
obtaining a constitutionally adequate hearing. Allowing such a hear-
ing will not necessarily affect the [provider's] entitlement to reim-
bursement or the amount allowed. Secondly, and more importantly,
the Medicare Act does not provide the [provider] an adequate alter-
279. See text & notes 132-36 supra.
280. 537 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
281. Id. at 287.
282. Id. at 286-87.
283. See note 235 supra.
284. 537 F.2d at 287.
285. Id. at 289-91, 293-94.
286. The court held that the makeup of the PAC was constitutional despite the fact that a
majority of the members were employees of the hospital's fiscal intermediary, as long as the Secre-
tary would review the decision before it became final to determine contentions concerning the
proper interpretation of the Medicare Act and regulations. Id. at 293. The court accordingly
remanded the case for such a final review.
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native means of obtaining judicial review of its due process claim.2 87
Bolstering its argument, the court of appeals noted that if section 405(h)
were read wholly to preclude adjudication of the provider's claim, "it
would raise serious constitutional problems which might impair the
force and effect of the Medicare Act."28
St. Louis University was decided two weeks after Eldridge, and the
opinion obviously was largely written before the Eldridge decision was
available. Since Eldridge, attempts to find jurisdiction by means of
statutory interpretation of section 405 have, of course, tracked the El-
dridge analysis by broadly interpreting section 405(g), rather than
slightly narrowing section 405(h).289 Since an Eldridge analysis is sim-
ply unworkable in many situations where the same constitutional con-
siderations are present 290 it appears that the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis
University was on the right track after all.
Adopting the proposed statutory analysis would not substantially
lessen the preclusive effort of section 405(h) as established in Saof. Be-
cause this restrictive reading of section 405(h) would permit jurisdiction
only in cases where the colorable constitutional claim could not have
been reviewed before, nor be meaningfully reviewed in the future,
under the Act, the reading would expand jurisdiction only to cases
where the Eldridge analysis already would provide jurisdiction and to
the limited types of cases where it is impossible to construe section
405(g) as applicable.
Moreover, if this proposed analysis had been applied, no Supreme
Court decision would have been decided differently. SaPfl would be
decided in the same way because the jurisdictional requirements of sec-
tion 405(g) were met. Jurisdiction would have been appropriate in El-
dridge under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because section 405(h) would not have
applied, since the plaintiff's colorable constitutional claim could never
be meaningfully reviewed under the Act.29" ' Such an analysis would
avoid the strained reading of section 405(g) necessary in Eldridge to
avoid section 405(h) preclusion. Moreover, the dictum in Sanders to
the effect that OASDI reopening decisions might in certain "rare" cases
be subject to review292 makes more sense under the proposed analysis.
If a claimant raises a constitutional claim upon reopening that could
not have been presented on review of the original claim, serious distor-
tion of section 405(g) would be necessary in order to find jurisdiction
287. Id. at 292.
288. Id.
289. See notes 163, 206 supra.
290. See text & notes 180-94 supra.
291. See 424 U.S. at 327.
292. 430 U.S. at 109.
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under that provision.2 93 Instead, section 405(h) should be interpreted
as inapplicable because such a claim does not "arise under" the Social
Security Act, and jurisdiction should be available under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
In a recent case involving the right to a hearing prior to recoup-
ment by HEW of Social Security overpayments, the government con-
ceded jurisdiction on the basis of Eldridge.294 Because jurisdiction was
therefore founded upon section 405(g), rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (as it would have been under the proposed analysis),
the Court was required to resolve whether section 405(g) permitted in-
junctive relief and whether class relief was available.295 While the
Supreme Court decided that both types of relief were available under
section 405(g),2 9 6 these holdings would have been unnecessary if the
Supreme Court had simply found that section 405(h) was inapplicable
under the proposed analysis. The result of the case would have been
the same.
The proposed analysis is not needed to reconcile previous
Supreme Court cases, however, but rather to permit jurisdiction in
those cases described above involving colorable constitutional claims as
to which section 405(g) must be construed as inapplicable. Thus in
claims brought by Medicare providers challenging as unconstitutional
the procedures used by the Secretary for pre-1972 periods, jurisdiction
would not be precluded by section 405(h) even though the Secretary's
decisions on the merits are not subject to review. Such review would be
in the district court where it belongs, and not in the Court of Claims,
which is singularly unsuited to handle such due process claims. Also,
for claims that the Secretary has violated constitutional due process in
failing to provide timely disability and SSI hearings, jurisdiction would
again not be precluded by section 405(h), and in order to reach this
conclusion there would be no need to stretch the section 405(g) require-
ment of a "final decision of the Secretary" beyond recognition. In re-
opening claims where a colorable constitutional issue could not have
been raised following the original denial, jurisdiction would be avail-
able, again despite the clear unavailability of section 405(g). Finally, in
cases where a nonclaimant's constitutional rights are violated by acts of
the Secretary under the Social Security Act, jurisdiction will be avail-
able despite section 405(g), assuming of course that the particular
293. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1977).
294. Califano v. Yarasaki, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558-59 (1979).
295. Id. at 2557-58, 2559-60.
296. Id.
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plaintiff otherwise has standing to sue.297
On the other hand, persons with nonconstitutional claims, includ-
ing those whose constitutional claims are only that the Secretary devi-
ated from his regulations, would in any case be unable to obtain
jurisdiction over OASDI, SSI, or Medicare-related claims outside of
the Social Security Act. This is consistent with the intent of section
405(h). The solution of finding that mandamus jurisdiction is not pre-
cluded by section 405(h) could, in contrast, lead to all manner of ordi-
nary challenges to the Secretary's actions. In addition, the solution of
finding jurisdiction over Medicare provider suits in the Court of Claims
has already led to that court's hearing ordinary challenges to the way in
which the Secretary applied his regulations to particular cases. 98
CONCLUSION
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court loosely interpreted section 405(g)
in order to permit federal jurisdiction over a due process claim not
otherwise meaningfully reviewable. In Sanders, the Court indicated
that it would only make such a liberal construction of section 405
where a colorable constitutional claim was present. In order to permit
federal jurisdiction over other constitutional claims involving the So-
cial Security Act not otherwise meaningfully reviewable, a preferable
route to the same result in Eldridge would be to determine that consti-
tutional claims never reviewable under the Act do not "arise under" the
Social Security Act for the purposes of section 405(h). To prevent this
exception from engulfing the rule, constitutional claims for this purpose
should not include claims that only allege that the Secretary failed to
follow the Act or his regulations properly.
297. See Baker v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835
(1977).
298. See Court of Claims cases cited in note 189 supra.
[Vol. 21
